TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/062590/0625510.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 14.4 KB | 335 lines

                                                                                INTERVIEW, Page 36

Driving Toward Unity



Sensitive to his country's history, Chancellor HELMUT KOHL warns
against isolating Germans and argues that unification is not
only urgent but will make the '90s the decade of Europe

By HENRY MULLER and KARSTEN PRAGER BONN and Helmut Kohl


    Q. Are you concerned about Soviet opposition to a united
Germany's membership in NATO?

    A. Anyone who wants a peaceful new Europe must remember that
one of the worst mistakes after the First World War was the
international isolation of the Weimar Republic. I am strictly
against repeating that mistake. Germany, and that includes a
unified Germany, is part of the Western community of shared
values. We cannot accept anything less. It is remarkable that
all Warsaw Pact countries except the Soviet Union are for full
German membership in NATO. Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia
are in favor of it -- unconditionally and completely. Why?
Simply because they do not want Germany to be isolated. The
U.S., all our other allies and the Germans themselves should
raise this issue in their talks with the Soviet Union. I think
there is a chance here for a positive conclusion.

    Of course, some transitional arrangements will be needed.
It is possible, for example, to allow the stationing of Soviet
troops for a certain period in what is today the German
Democratic Republic. I also consider it feasible that in the
parallel negotiations in Vienna -- but not in the Two-plus-Four
framework -- we talk about troop levels generally. Because one
point is very clear: the Soviet Union certainly has a
legitimate security interest.


    Q. A negative way of looking at the question is that the
Western allies and some of the East Europeans in fact want NATO
to keep the Germans under control.

    A. I am not concerned at all about motivations. I don't
agree with such reasons, but the end result is the same. I want
Germany to remain in NATO. The fact that there are reasons that
are not particularly friendly to the Germans -- well, I can
accept that in view of our history.

    There are many who think, Well, it's better to have a solid
roof over the Germans. There are some who want two roofs, NATO
and European unity. And I agree. My motives are different, but
the results are what count. You'll see; German unification will
give a big boost to European unification.


    Q. Why two roofs?

    A. German unity in the year 2000 cannot be the same as
German unity in 1900. The future of free Europe is not the
future of the old nation-state. We are talking about a wider
opening, and that is the hour of Europe. It also offers new
opportunities to the Germans. That is in keeping with the mood
here: the Fatherland is Germany, the future is Europe. That is
today's phrase.

    Had you asked about Europe five or six years ago, you would
have used the term Eurosclerosis -- the concept of a bad
disease associated with Europe. Today no one mentions
Eurosclerosis anymore. Instead people are asking, Are you
building a Fortress Europe? That's exactly the opposite
anxiety. But we are not going to build a Fortress Europe
either. I oppose protectionist policies.


    Q. How will the world continue to change as we approach the
year 2000?

    A. We will reduce the East-West confrontation further. We
will make a lot of progress on the road to disarmament and
detente. We will still need weapons and soldiers by the year
2000 because even then we will not have freedom for nothing.
I am against a disarmament policy that takes announcements as
deeds. You must be sure you get something in exchange for your
concessions.


    Q. And how will Europe fit into that world?

    A. The North-South conflict will become far more dangerous
than it is today. I foresee three very important economic
regions developing by the year 2000: the U.S. and Canada,
perhaps on the road to an association with Mexico; the Far
East; and Europe -- the European Community -- which will
continue to grow into a political union, beyond economic union.
Europe, of course, is not the E.C. alone. The E.C. is just a
torso. A wider network will be constructed with other European
countries, not necessarily by making them members but perhaps
through association treaties.

    The Soviet Union too is going to seek its place in this
emerging Europe, at least economically. For the Germans, this
is essential. Geographically, our location offers great
advantages, but there are also disadvantages. For a long time
our central location has been more of a scourge and a danger
for us. Now it may be our big chance; perhaps we can be the
bridge. But we can be that bridge only if what supports it in
the West is very strong. That brings me back to NATO and
Europe. I am convinced that this is going to be the decade of
the Europeans.


    Q. Do you see the Soviet Union as part of Europe politically
too?

    A. At this moment no one can predict the future of the
Soviet Union. I do hope Gorbachev will succeed in his reform
policies. I sincerely hope that. Because perestroika means
pluralism, and that means opening. This is what the Soviet
Union needs; otherwise it will not be in a position to solve
its problems, neither those of the nationalities nor those of
the economy. I think the West should assist the Soviet Union
in this process. Of course, we have to do it in a reasonable,
businesslike way; after all, we are talking about a proud
country. But we have to do it in the spirit of friendship.


    Q. Are the Soviets telling you anything bilaterally that
they are not saying in public?

    A. [Laughing] This is not a subject I would discuss with
TIME magazine.


    Q. Let me rephrase . . .

    A. You need not continue. I am not going to say anything on
that. I know what you were going to ask.


    Q. Can you simply proceed toward unity and NATO membership
and say, "This is what we are going to do, whatever Gorbachev
may say"?

    A. No, we have to negotiate. No question about that. Of
course, we are going to continue to negotiate.


    Q. You do seem to be in a hurry about unification.

    A. Not at all. Newspapers write that, but they are wrong.
Of course, there is a certain urgency, but it is not caused by
me. I feel that urgency. When I drew up the ten-point
unification program in the Bundestag last November, I started
with a completely different time frame. I thought that in 1990
we would have a contractual or treaty-based community with East
Germany, that in 1991 or 1992 we would have confederative
structures. Then in 1993 or 1994 we could have unification.

    But Mr. [Hans] Modrow [then East German Prime Minister] did
not keep his promises. He did not pursue liberalization of the
economic system. On the contrary, he made the decision to
restore the state security service. That triggered a
catastrophic psychological development in the G.D.R. You could
read it like a thermometer: every day more and more East
Germans moved here. And you must bear in mind the size of the
Federal Republic. It is not an enormous country, yet since Jan.
1 of this year 220,000 people have come across. That is why I
said in January that we needed economic and currency union. Had
I not done so and had we not had the East German elections on
March 18, we would now have 600,000 or more people here.
Imagine what that would have done. These are good people:
craftsmen, programmers, doctors, chemists. They are all needed
over there. You cannot rebuild the East German economy without
them. Apart from that, over the same period we accommodated
175,000 resettlers of German origin from Poland, Romania and
other East European countries.


    Q. Will this pressure lead to all-German elections this year
rather than later?

    A. On July 1, with the deutsche mark in the G.D.R., millions
of people will for the first time hold in their hands a
currency that can buy things. They will not start a theoretical
or philosophical discussion. Rather, a husband will say to his
wife, "Let's go to Paris." And they will walk along the Champs
Elysees and feel they are in the center of the world. These
people will set the date of the election. I don't know the
date, but I would say it will be soon.

    Ordinarily, politicians ask themselves, Do we have a
precedent for this? How was it handled in the past? But what
we are doing now has never been done before. We have to decide
things in a matter of hours that we would normally decide over
a period of years.

    When Lothar de Maiziere became East Germany's Prime
Minister, he didn't even have a working telephone. So I would
have to send somebody from West Berlin to see him, or he would
have to go to West Berlin and phone me. That was right after
Easter. Since then we have completed a state treaty. Had you
told me this a year ago, I would have said you were crazy. It's
a crazy time, but also a fantastic time. I think of it as a
blessing, in a way. And, of course, it is the fulfillment of
a dream for Europe and for Germany.

    Two weeks ago, I paid a visit to the grave of Ludwig Erhard
in a village in Bavaria. I told my wife, Had Erhard in 1948 had
to consult with all the different people I have to talk to
today, we would still have bread rationing.

    No matter what is going to be negotiated, I have one
consolation: the Rhine is flowing on and will reach the sea.
It is the same with German unity. And there is something I know
today that I did not expect five years ago: this decade will
also bring European unity.


    Q. How important will the U.S. be in Europe's future?

    A. Very important. For me, Europe would risk a part of its
future if it did not include the Americans. We need them not
only for military security, as important as that is, but in
every possible way -- in the economic field, in the cultural
field. For the future of Germans in the 21st century, it is of
existential importance that our policy rest on two secure
pillars: the German-American pillar and the German-French
pillar. It is not a matter of either-or but one of as-well-as.
And that does not mean we are diminishing other partners.


    Q. You will probably go into the history books as the
"unification Chancellor."

    A. You'd better not talk about history books. People who
want to get into history books don't get into them.


    Q. But does the possibility influence you in a special way?

    A. Of course. It influences my feeling about life, but not
with a view to the history books. One has a dream. The dream,
not just for me but for a whole generation, was to obtain
German unity and European unity. I always believed it would
happen, but I was very skeptical that I would live to see it.
I certainly did not foresee that I would experience it while
in this office. Now the opportunity is here. I have never
worked so hard in all my life. But I have never been so happy.


    Q. The events of the past six months have revived certain
stereotypes about Germans: they are arrogant, domineering . .
.

    A. Supposedly.


    Q. Is there a German national character?

    A. I suppose there are characteristics you find more in one
country than in another. Latin countries, for example, appear
to enjoy life more. People in Paris or Rome, faced with an
event as momentous to them as German unity is to us, would have
celebrated with big parties. But in this country, people sit
and study the details and say, "Let's reserve our joy for
later." They do not realize that by then they will be so old
that they won't be able to experience the joy. I say this in
jest, yet I am serious. The fact that in three or four years
the area now contained in East Germany will be flourishing will
be a typically German achievement. But the question is, will
we enjoy it?

    One must be honest with oneself. We had two wars in this
century. Everyone tumbled into World War I out of foolishness.
But there is no question that Hitler was responsible for World
War II and that the crimes perpetrated by the Nazi tyranny were
terrible crimes. We cannot expect that memory to be erased in
people's minds.

    Germans are hardworking and successful. But they are not
loved. They are respected. But they are not liked. Now nearly
17 million will be added, and those who recall the past say,
"Ah, Kohl is trying to speed things up." They call it "Kohl's
blitzkrieg." You have to live with that. I cannot deny our
history; I have to accept it. If I meet a Jewish countryman
whose family was killed at Auschwitz and who knows German but
refuses to speak it, I have to respect that. I can only ask for
forgiveness; I have no claim on it.


    Q. Do you understand why the Poles were so dissatisfied with
your legalistic position on their border with Germany?

    A. The main problem with the Poles, in their assessment of
what I proposed, is that they misunderstood my argument. I
never left any doubt that on the road to unification, Poland's
western border must be guaranteed. There are different opinions
on how to do this, but I am firmly convinced that mine will
carry the most political weight. This week in the East German
parliament and in our Bundestag we will pass resolutions
clearly stating that a unified Germany will conclude a treaty
with Poland, binding under international law, in which the
border will be guaranteed definitively. More cannot be done.


    Q. Should Berlin be the capital of a united Germany?

    A. Everyone knows that I am an old supporter of Berlin. But
this subject does not have to be dealt with now. It will be
debated in an all-German parliament. The decision on a capital
cannot be made as long as Soviet troops are deployed there. The
Rhine will flow for a long time until this question is raised.
If that were our only problem, we would have no problems.


    Q. What then is Germany's most pressing problem?

    A. We have economic, material problems, but all of them can
be solved. At issue is the moral strength of our people. Have
we lost some of that during the years of affluence and
prosperity? I don't think so. But a layer of butter and kiwi
and shrimp has covered our moral strength. It will reappear
when we remove that layer. The term idealism was born here --
it was the contribution of German philosophers, and it was
abused terribly in this century. There was a backlash, and now
we have to achieve a sort of balance.